My Fedora 14 policy for the adventurous.
I have been working on a policy for Fedora 14. Three different policies actually. One for a minimal fedora installation (--nobase), one for a minimal fedora installation with libvirt and a policy for a minimal gnome desktop system.
The minimal policy for Fedora 14 gnome desktops is the interesting one. It aims to confine the gnome desktop on workstations. That means it supports almost none system services, excepts the base essentials. It does not have policy for any mail servers, it does have policy for ssh and even httpd. Http policy because gnome-user-share relies on it (dav)
What it lacks in system services it makes up for in application domains. That is to say it supports some gnome apps, and the user apps that do not have policy should be able to make to work by toggling the gnome_$1_targeted boolean where $1 is your user role prefix. Caution though that this hasnt been tested yet because my sole priority lies with a confined gnome, and this is enough work as is.
There are atleast some things to do if one decides to give it a spin.
One should add the following directories to /etc/skel:
One should also modify /usr/share/dracut/modules.d/98selinux/selinux-loadpolicy.sh
mount --bind /dev "$NEWROOT/dev"
chroot "$NEWROOT" /sbin/restorecon -R /dev
..and then use dracut to build a new initramfs for your current kernel.
Also fix /root:
semanage fcontext -a -e /home/joe /root
restorecon -R -v /root
Typically you would:
rpm -ev selinux-policy selinux-policy-targeted
rpm -Uvh selinux-policy-2.20100524-1.fc14.noarch.rpm selinux-policy-bare_gui-2.20100524-1.fc14.noarch.rpm
edit /etc/selinux/config and set selinux back to enforcing and point to bare_gui instead of targeted
relabel the file system
best to add a new user (make it staff_u as its user_u by default (sorry no unconfined_u in this policy by default)
make sure to add the user to sudo:
echo "joe ALL=(ALL) ROLE=sysadm_r TYPE=sysadm_t ALL" > /etc/sudoers.d/joe
chmod 0440 /etc/sudoers.d/joe
This policy confines all domains. also kernel_t and rpm_t. installation of packages and updting of packages should probably be done in permissive mode for now because the rpm domain needs some more loving. (common packages will work but dont try to install a kernel in enforcing mode or some service that gets restarted in the post-install script.
As said, this only works with gnome if it works at all (dont worry i am using it on my desktops) but only try this if youre a bit familar with selinux, are feeling adventurous and if you dont panic quickly.
By default the minimal gnome environment is confined. Gnome apps by default arent allowed to interact with users and often arent allowed to run generic applications. For example the printer applet currently is not confined (i dont like printing its a waste of paper and ink), thus gnome will not be able to run the printer applet until a policy for it is implemented.
The idea is that gnome can easily be allowed to interact with these generic apps and be allowed to communicate with users by toggling the gnome_$1_targeted boolean. However this is still untested.
Youll notice that youll have to unlock youre gnome keyring on each login. I am not sure why but gnome keyring daemon or whatever runs it (probably dbus, maybe xdm?) tries to manipulate selinux into running in the user domain which i forcefully prevent so that it can be made to run confined.
If something is confined then youll be able to run it in a confined environment with gnome_$1_targeted boolean set to off, Else you wont be able to run it untill some policy for it gets implemented.
The apps you are able to run may not be confined perfectly yet for all use cases (its a lot of work).
Stuff that works for me:
a lot of default gnome apps/applets/session services
Stuff that is not supported (atleast):
So one should be able to do some of the basics.
Why confining the desktop? Not so much to protect generic user content. I use to think this is important but as my policy evolved i discovered that the important thing here is the integrity of gnome and user apps.
For example: protect access to your keyring, gpg data, ssh data, firefox data etc.
Not protecting access to your generic ~/.porn directory
So how would you get started?
We you can get a tar ball of a recent snapshot here:
Just put the tarball in your ~/rpmbuild/SOURCES directory. Extract the support/selinux-policy.spec from the tarball and put that into ~/rpmbuild/SPECS/
then just rpmbuild -ba ~/rpmbuild/SPECS/selinux-policy.spec
it will spit out 3 packages by default (bare_gui and its docs package) which you can install. You do not require the docs rpm but installing it doesnt hurt either.
If you want to try the bare or bare_virt model you can do so by editing the selinux-policy.spec and set the %define for that model to 1. it will build an rpm for that aswell.
Remember, expect plenty boogs i would love to receive some feedback or even help in improving the policy. It is a lot of work but the concept is very powerful. By confining the layer between the user and the system (the desktop) we achieve a lot more flexibility. We can then define what each user domain can and cannot do by simply implementing a boolean.
The idea about the bare and bare_virt models is that its strict, the unconfined module is install but not used. Another important property of bare and bare_virt is small footprint. It only installs the bare minimum modules which keeps the policy small. if one decides to run a service that is not currently supported in bare or bare_virt then one can use loadable module to implement it. The policy is focussed on advanced administrators that value small foot print and want total control over have gets installed and what not.
Questions comments? domg472 at gmail dot com
Some background information:
the policy is based off of recent refpolicy. refpolicy aims the be a base for basically any kind of model. Unfortunately i had to edit refpolicy atleast to remove unconfined_domains ( i think refpolicy probably shouldnt have unconfined domains as its easier to add and unconfined domain than to remove one) also i had to remove and/or redo most of refpolicies user application policies. I think it may be better for refpolicy to ignore user application policies or atleast prefix them all. domains like ssh_t arent helpful in a confined user space, as a confined user space relies heavily on user role prefixes.
Why not base it on fedora policy?
All of the above discussed issues apply, plus. Fedora tends to avoid issues by adding modules to base. This causes problems. My policy only has modules in the kernel layer in base all other modules can be disabled in theory. Fedora focusses on usability. little things like easily allowing access to all user content makes it hard to confine the user space.
unlabeled_t type - I often see bug reports or people showing AVC messages about confined domains not able to deal with unlabeled_t files. *type=AVC msg=audit(1530786314.091...
6 dagen geleden